Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 64

Issue 4

Article 5

2014

Fracking Bans, Taxation, and Environmental Policy
Robert D. Cheren

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert D. Cheren, Fracking Bans, Taxation, and Environmental Policy, 64 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 1483 (2014)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol64/iss4/5

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 4· 2014

Fracking Bans, Taxation, and
Environmental Policy
Robert D. Cheren†
Abstract
This Article investigates the tax bases of local jurisdictions that
have imposed bans on horizontal slickwater fracturing, colloquially
known as fracking. Local governments that draw little additional
revenue from fracking are more likely to ban the practice because of
environmental concerns. The correlation between the issuance of local
fracking bans and the relative absence of additional local revenue
from fracking indicates the importance of taxation in determining
the proper balance between federal, state, and local governments in
the process of making environmental policy.
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This theory of representative taxation presented for the first time here
began as a side note in Tragic Parlor Pigs and Comedic Rascally Rabbits,
63 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 555, 573 (2012) (“The Crown’s primary
interest, as residual beneficiary of all production, was to see production
maximized in order to generate higher revenues.”); id. n.70 (“The
Crown received income from production. If production increased, the
Crown’s revenue increased. If production decreased, the Crown’s
revenue decreased. It is therefore understandable that the policies of the
Crown courts fell in line with the needs and desires of the Exchequer.”).
The efforts of Professor Peter M. Gerhart, Professor Jonathan L. Entin,
David Carper, and Mary Koch in the development of that work laid the
foundation for this theory and so the Author again owes them dearly.
Following the publication of Tragic Parlor Pigs, the Author developed
this theory through extensive research into the history of taxation and
English constitutional law carried out with the invaluable guidance,
support, and good humor of Professor Erik M. Jensen. Finally, Professor
Jonathan H. Adler provided the opportunity to prepare and publish this
Article and offered important assistance along the way.
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Introduction
In November 1922, the Village Council of Euclid, Ohio, adopted
an ordinance1 “establishing a comprehensive zoning plan.”2 Ambler
Realty challenged the ordinance on the grounds that its restrictions
and controls would “confiscate and destroy a great part of [the] value”
of land falling within regions zoned for limited residential purposes.3
The United States Supreme Court held the ordinance a valid exercise
of the police power of the state delegated to local jurisdictions like
Euclid to keep pigs out of the parlors but permit pigs in barnyards.4
Local jurisdictions to this day limit certain land uses to certain areas.
Further, just as in the Village of Euclid’s 1922 zoning ordinance,
certain land uses are “prohibited altogether” by local jurisdictions.5
Recently, numerous jurisdictions across the United States have made
natural gas exploration and production a prohibited use as a result of
environmental concerns over the practice of horizontal slickwater
fracturing, colloquially known as fracking. These fracking bans cover
thousands of square miles of land above gas laden shale formations.
This is a whole ocean of natural gas no one can get at.6
This is not an article on fracking technology or its environmental
consequences. Rather, this Article uses the phenomena of local
fracking bans to demonstrate an attribute of governmental entities
relevant to the determination of the proper locus of environmental
policymaking—taxation. This Article shows that local jurisdictions
that draw no additional revenue from fracking are more likely to
impose fracking bans and conversely local jurisdictions that draw
additional revenue from fracking are less likely to do so.
1.

Village of Euclid, Ohio, Zoning Ordinance 2812 (Nov. 13, 1922).

2.

Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 379 (1926).

3.

Id. at 384.

4.

Id. at 388.

5.

Id. at 381. The Euclid ordinance banned ten categories of land use: “(1)
Veterinary hospital. (2) Reduction of garbage, refuse, offal, or dead
animals. (3) Explosives and fireworks, manufacture or storage. (4)
Cement, lime, gypsum or plaster-of-paris manufacture. (5) Chlorine, or
gydrochloric, nitric or picric acid manufacture. (6) Smelting of iron,
copper, tin or zinc ores. (7) Distillation of bones, fat rendering, glue
manufacture from raw materials, fertilizer manufacture. (8) Stockyards,
slaughtering of animals. (9) Tanneries, oil refineries. (10) Storage of
volatile oil or gasoline in excess of 25000 gallons.” Village of Euclid,
Ohio, Zoning Ordinance 2812. A careful reading of that comprehensive
zoning plan suggests fracking would have been permitted in industrial
areas.

6.

There Will Be Blood (Paramount Vantage and Miramax Films
2007) (“There is a whole ocean of oil under our feet. No one can get at
it except for me.”).
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Why the connection between fracking bans and taxation? When a
potential land use will increase revenues, a local jurisdiction exercising
its zoning power must either permit the use or forfeit the additional
revenue. This Article posits that governmental entities tend to
maximize their revenue. Accordingly, local jurisdictions will tend to
permit revenue-generating uses. But whether any potential land use
generates revenue for a local jurisdiction depends on the local
jurisdiction’s financial characteristics. These financial characteristics
vary significantly from state to state and, to a lesser degree, from
locality to locality within each state. In order to predict whether a
local jurisdiction is likely or unlikely to ban fracking, one need only
follow the money generated from the use of fracking and see whether
any significant portion falls into the hands of the local jurisdiction.

I.

Local Fracking Bans

This investigation of local fracking bans requires detailed data on
their incidence. To this end, Geographic Information System maps
were obtained for the political subdivisions of states covered by three
overlapping shale plays, the Devonian, Marcellus, and Utica, a region
laden with shale formations ripe for fracking.7 These shale plays reach
across New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, West Virginia, Maryland,
Kentucky, and Virginia.8 Of the political subdivisions that govern
these territories, the vast majority have not banned fracking. In all,
political subdivisions covering 4,400.07 out of a total of 120,129.38
square miles have imposed a legislative fracking ban or moratorium.
But these fracking bans and moratoria are almost entirely confined
within New York and a small portion of Pennsylvania in and around
Pittsburgh. Of the political subdivisions outside New York and this
small portion of Pennsylvania, fracking bans and moratoria have
touched only 21.24 square miles of the shale plays, less than half of
one percent of the total area touched by legislative fracking bans in
the shale plays. The concentration of 99.517% of fracking bans by
area in the state of New York and the Pittsburgh metropolitan area
represents a significant variance in legislative responses to fracking
amongst political subdivisions in as opposed to outside these regions.
7.

Figures and statistics in this Article were prepared and calculated using
the ArcGIS platform. Geographic Information System shale play maps
were obtained from the United State Energy Information
Administration and were last updated May 9, 2011, available at http:
//www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications/maps/
maps.htm. Political subdivision maps were obtained by the Case
Western Reserve University Kelvin Smith Library staff. This Article is
limited to the local bans imposed as of August 31, 2013.

8.

This Article is limited to these three shale plays, leaving out the Antrim
shale play, which covers part of Ohio, and the New Albany shale play,
which covers part of Kentucky.
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Devonian Shale Play
M arcellus Shale Play
Utica Shale Play
Locality Outside Shale Plays
Locality I nside Shale Plays
Local Legislative Fracking Ban
Local V oter Enacted Fracking Ban

Figure 1: Devonian, Marcellus, and Utica Fracking Bans
Shale Plays
Area
(sq. miles)

Percentage

Ban

Legislative Ban

Area
Percentage
Area
Percentage
(sq. miles)
(sq. miles)

Kentucky

7,478.89

6.218

0.00

0.000

0

0.000

Maryland

1,077.92

0.896

1.94

0.180

1.94

0.180

New York

26,451.75

21.993

4,309.73

16.293

4,309.73

16.293

Ohio

24,761.36

20.587

43.83

0.177

0

0.000

Pennsylvania

33,669.29

27.994

76.40

0.227

76.40

0.227

West Virginia

21,867.91

18.182

12.00

0.055

12.00

0.055

Virginia

4,966.86

4.130

0.00

0.000

0

0.000

4,443.90

3.695

4,400.07

3.658

Total 120,273.98

Table 1: Local Fracking Bans

The shale plays intersect 7,478.89 square miles of Kentucky
political subdivisions and 4,966.86 square miles of Virginia political
subdivisions. No local jurisdiction in either state has banned fracking.
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Ohio’s political subdivisions that intersect the shale plays cover
24,761.36 square miles of the state.9 No legislative bans have been
imposed by political subdivisions within Ohio’s shale plays. The
state’s only legislative ban was imposed by Yellow Springs, a village
located far outside the shale plays.10 The only legislative activities in
political subdivisions in the state apart from the Village of Yellow
Springs are pronouncements by the political subdivisions that fracking
will not be pursued on public lands. Residents of two cities within
Ohio’s shale plays voted to amend their city charters to ban fracking
by wide margins—62.87% to 37.13% in Mansfield11 and 66.37% to
33.63% in Broadview Heights.12 These margins are even greater than
the only other voter ban, enacted by the voters of Ferguson
Township, Pennsylvania, by a margin of 52.17% to 47.83%.13 Despite
this evidence of significant local opposition to fracking in Ohio, no
local legislatures within Ohio’s shale plays has enacted a ban
on fracking.
Devonian Shale Play
M arcellus Shale Play
Utica Shale Play
Locality Outside Shale Plays
Locality I nside Shale Plays
Local Legislative Fracking Ban
Local V oter Enacted Fracking Ban

Figure 2: Ohio Fracking Bans

9.

This is 505 of the state’s 942 cities and villages and 783 of the state’s
1,330 townships.

10.

Yellow Springs, Ohio, Resolution 2011-25 (May 16, 2011).

11.

Mansfield, Ohio, Ordinance 12-178 (Oct. 23, 2012).

12.

Broadview Heights, Ohio, Ordinance 115-12 (Sept. 4, 2012). These two
cities cover 43.83 square miles.

13.

Ferguson, Pa., 2012 General Election Petition (Aug. 12, 2012).
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The shale plays cover nearly the whole of West Virginia—
intersecting political subdivisions covering 21,867.91 square miles.
Only the cities of Morgantown14 and Wellsburg15 enacted legislative
fracking bans, neither of which is still in force.16 These jurisdictions
cover only 12 square miles of the state. Thus, fracking has only ever
been legislatively restricted by political subdivision in a scant 0.055%
of West Virginia’s shale plays.

Devonian Shale Play
M arcellus Shale Play
Utica Shale Play
Locality Outside Shale Plays
Locality I nside Shale Plays
Local Legislative Fracking Ban

Figure 3: West Virginia Fracking Bans

Maryland has one fracking ban among its political subdivisions
that intersect the shale plays. These political subdivisions cover
1,077.92 square miles. Only the 1.94 square mile town of Mountain
14.

Morgantown, W. Va., Ordinance § 721 (2011).

15.

Wellsburg, W. Va., Ordinance § 725 (2011).

16.

Wellsburg repealed its ban. Wellsburg, W. Va., Ordinance 2011-7-1
(Aug. 7, 2011). A local judge held Morgantown’s fracking ban
preempted by state law. Order at 11, Ne. Natural Energy, LLC v. City
of Morgantown, No. 11-C-411 (Cir. Ct. Monongalia Cnty., Aug. 12,
2011). Morgantown officials failed to give notice of appeal in time. Too
Late for Morgantown’s Fracking Ban, WBOY-12 (Aug 23, 2012, 1:06
PM), http://www.wboy.com/Global/story.asp?S=15944263. Morgantown now limits the areas in which fracking may take place.
Morgantown, W. Va., Zoning Ordinance § 1355.08(C) (2012).
For a discussion of the challenge to the Morgantown’s fracking ban, see
John R. Nolon & Steven E. Gavin, Hydrofracking: State Preemption,
Local Power, and Cooperative Governance, 63 Case W. Res. L. Rev.
995, 1026–31 (2013).
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Lake Park imposed a legislative ban on fracking.17 Thus, only 0.18%
of Maryland’s shale plays have been restricted. Yet, the majority of
Maryland’s shale plays are inside two counties. Maryland’s counties
differ greatly in their financial characteristics from Maryland’s cities
and towns. It is therefore worthy of note that the ban covers 13.99%
of Maryland’s non-county political subdivisions in the shale plays.

Devonian Shale Play
M arcellus Shale Play
Utica Shale Play
Locality Outside Shale Plays
Locality I nside Shale Plays
Local Legislative Fracking Ban

Figure 4: Maryland Fracking Bans

Pennsylvania’s political subdivisions that intersect the shale plays
cover 33,669.29 square miles of the state.18 Legislatures in six
boroughs and the city of Pittsburgh covering a mere 76.40 square
miles of the shale plays have imposed fracking bans.19 This is only
0.227% of the area of Pennsylvania’s political subdivisions in the shale
plays. Five of the six boroughs that have banned fracking are in the
immediate vicinity of Pittsburgh, a highly localized concentration.20 In
addition, no new local legislatures in Pennsylvania have imposed
fracking bans after the passage of Pennsylvania’s Act 13, an act
17.

Mountain Lake Park, Ordinance 2011-01 (March 3, 2011).

18.

This is 1,796 of the state’s 2,572 political subdivisions.

19.

The boroughs are Forest Hills, Emsworth, Baldwin, Harveys Lake,
Wilkinsburg, and West Homestead. Forest Hills, Pa., Ordinance 1017
(Oct. 19, 2011); Emsworth, Pa., Ordinances § 161 (2011); Baldwin,
Pa., Code § 121 (2011); Harveys Lake, Pa., Ordinance 4 (2011);
Wilkinsburg, Pa., Ordinance 2870 (July 20, 2011); West Homestead,
Pa., Ordinance 659 (May, 10, 2011).

20.

The other borough, Harveys Lake, covers only 7.3 square miles.
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providing for additional regulation of fracking as well as the collection
and distribution of a fracking impact fee, on February 14, 2012.21 The
only fracking ban imposed in Pennsylvania after Act 13 was imposed
in the Township of Ferguson—a town apparently just outside the
shale plays—by the town’s voters, not its legislators.22

Devonian Shale Play
M arcellus Shale Play
Utica Shale Play
Locality Outside Shale Plays
Locality I nside Shale Plays
Local Legislative Fracking Ban
Local V oter Enacted Fracking Ban

Figure 5: Pennsylvania Fracking Bans

New York has numerous political subdivisions that have imposed
legislative fracking bans and moratoria. New York’s political
subdivisions that intersect the shale plays cover 26,451.75 square
miles. Of those, fracking bans have been imposed by 42 political
subdivisions covering 1,746.38 square miles and fracking moratoria
have been imposed by 68 political subdivisions covering 2,563.35
square miles.23 Thus, 16.293% of New York’s shale plays have been
restricted by legislative bans and moratoria imposed by political
subdivisions.24 In addition, several political subdivisions that are just

21.

H.B. 1950, Gen. Assemb., Sess. of 2012 (Pa. 2012). Pennsylvania’s Oil
and Gas Act is codified at 58 P.S. §§ 601.101–601.605 (2010).

22.

Ferguson, Pa., 2012 General Election Petition (Aug. 6, 2012).

23.

Note that jurisdictions that imposed both a moratoria and a ban are
counted as a ban jurisdiction only.

24.

For the sake of linguistic simplicity in this Article, the general term
“fracking bans” includes moratoria. But of the shale plays investigated
here, only local jurisdictions in New York have imposed moratoria.
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outside EIA’s 2011 map of the shale plays have also imposed fracking
bans and moratoria.25

Devonian Shale Play
M arcellus Shale Play
Utica Shale Play
Locality Outside Shale Plays
Locality I nside Shale Plays
Local Legislative Fracking Ban

Figure 6: New York Fracking Bans

New York political subdivisions account for a whopping 97.947%
of the area in which local legislative bans have been imposed in the
shale plays. The Pittsburgh metropolitan area accounts for another
1.570% of the area, and all Pennsylvania local legislative bans precede
the passage of Pennsylvania Act 13 on February 14, 2012. All other
legislative ban jurisdictions combined constitute only 0.483% of the
area in which a legislative ban has been imposed in the shale plays.

II. Local Taxation of Fracking
Suppose governmental entities tend to maximize revenue by
preferring policies that increase tax receipts. Revenue maximization
would render some forms of taxation representative of certain
interests in that the presence of these forms of taxation would yield
governmental cultivation and protection of those interests in order to
maximize revenue. Conversely, a relative absence of taxes that
represent certain interests in this way would result in lesser
governmental cultivation and protection of those interests. If this
were true, revenue maximization behavior by local jurisdictions would
25.

Nine political subdivisions just outside the shale plays covering 260.01
square miles imposed bans and 13 political subdivisions just outside the
shale plays covering 365.29 square miles imposed moratoria.
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play a significant but unappreciated role in the fight over fracking.
There is great variation in local taxation of fracking in the shale
plays. In most jurisdictions, fracking is representatively taxed through
either representative property taxes or representative income taxes or
both. But no New York political subdivisions within the shale plays
impose representative taxes at all. And when Pennsylvania local
legislatures imposed fracking bans, fracking had the potential to
generate only minimal revenue until the passage of Pennsylvania Act
13 provided localities the opportunity to receive substantial revenue
from fracking. Accordingly, the absence or presence of representative
taxation of fracking is highly predictive of whether a local legislature
will impose a ban on fracking.
Ohio has two classes of local political subdivisions that may
exercise the Euclidian zoning power—townships and municipal
corporations. Municipal corporations with fewer than 5,000 residents
are villages, and municipal corporations with more than 5,000
residents are cities.26 Ohio townships, villages, and cities are
authorized to levy real property taxes without voter approval at a
rate of up to one percent of assessed valuation.27 Taxable real
property includes subsurface natural gas.28 Accordingly, an Ohio city,
village, or township permitting fracking increases local property tax
revenues, and an Ohio city, village, or township banning fracking
decreases local property tax revenues. Ohio cities and villages, but not
Ohio townships, also may levy up to a one percent tax on income that
includes income from natural gas production and income from natural
gas industry jobs.29 Accordingly, an Ohio city or village permitting
fracking also increases local income tax revenues, and an Ohio city or
village that bans fracking also decreases local income tax revenues. If
local legislatures maximize revenue, this revenue reality would explain
the absence of local legislative fracking bans in Ohio’s shale plays
despite the evident popular opposition to fracking in Ohio.
Kentucky cities, urban-county governments, and counties exercise
the zoning power. Kentucky cities and urban-county governments are
authorized to levy real property taxes at rates up to 0.75%, 1%, or

26.

Ohio Const. art. XVIII, § 1.

27.

Ohio Const. art. XII, § 2; Ohio Const. art XVIII § 13; Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 5705.02 (LexisNexis 2013); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 5705.07 (LexisNexis 2013).

28.

Ohio Admin. Code 5703-25-11(I) (2010).

29.

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 718.01(C) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2013).
For a basic list of taxable and non-taxable types of income, see FAQ—
Individuals—Taxable/Nontaxable, Reg’l Income Tax Agency,
http://www.ritaohio.com/faq?fId=1288 (last visited March 2, 2014).
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1.5% of assessed valuation depending upon population.30 Kentucky
counties are authorized to levy real property taxes at rates up to 0.5%
of assessed valuation.31 Taxable real property in Kentucky includes
natural gas.32 Accordingly, like their Ohio counterparts, Kentucky
political subdivisions deciding whether to ban fracking will see either
increases or decreases on local property tax revenues. Further, a
substantial portion of Kentucky political subdivisions collect taxes
deceptively referred to as occupational licenses.33 Three types of taxes
are collected under this heading—wage, net profit, and gross receipts
taxes—and each political subdivision imposing these taxes collects one
or two of these types.34 Five counties and eight cities covering
1,456.405 square miles intersecting the shale plays impose an
occupational license regime that taxes both net profits and wages.
This form of taxation is equivalent to a general tax on income and
includes both income from natural gas production and wages from
natural gas industry jobs. These jurisdictions stand in the same shoes
with respect to the decision whether to permit or ban fracking as
Ohio cities and villages. Five counties and eight cities covering
1,574.467 square miles intersecting the shale plays impose an
occupational license regime that taxes only wages. This form of
taxation does not cover production income but still reaches additional
wages from natural gas jobs. Jurisdictions that impose this form of
occupational license regime taxing only wages have greater motivation
to permit fracking than Ohio townships but less motivation than Ohio
cities and villages. The 11 counties and 46 cities intersecting the shale
plays that do not impose any occupational license regime stand in the
same shoes as Ohio townships because they receive no revenue either
from natural gas production apart from property taxes.
Virginia cities and counties exercise the Euclidian zoning power.
The Virginia political subdivisions also levy real property taxes on
natural gas deposits. But Virginia has no legal limitations on local
property tax rates—limiting the representative impact of these real
property taxes on natural gas, as discussed in detail below regarding
the state of New York. Nevertheless, Virginia political subdivisions
may impose a gross receipts tax on natural gas production as a
30.

Ky. Const. § 157. City and urban-county government tax rates are
further capped to a floating percent of assessed valuation based on
revenue collected in the preceding year. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
132.010(6) (West 2010 & Supp. 2013); § 132.027 (West 2010).

31.

Ky. Const. § 157.

32.

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 132.820 (West 2010).

33.

2014 Kentucky Communities Imposing an Occupational Tax, Ky. Soc’y
of Certified Pub. Accountants, https://www.kycpa.org/Content/
Files/OccTax.pdf (last updated Feb. 2014).

34.

Id.
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business license tax—and all of the political subdivisions with
producing gas wells in Virginia do so.35 The power of Virginia cities
and counties to tax a percentage of the gross receipts of natural gas
production is entirely consistent with the utter absence of local bans
on fracking in Virginia’s shale plays.
West Virginia counties, cities, towns, and villages exercise the
Euclidian zoning power.36 The West Virginia Constitution sets statewide maximum property tax rates for four classes of property and the
West Virginia Code further provides maximum county and municipal
tax rates on those classes of property.37 Taxable real property includes
subsurface natural gas.38 And so, just as in Ohio and Kentucky,
permitting fracking in West Virginia increases local property tax
35.

Va. Code Ann. § 58.1-3712 (2013); Va. Code Ann. § 58.1-3712.1 (2013);
Va. Code Ann. § 58.1-3713 (2013); Va. Code Ann. § 58.1-3713.3 (2013);
Va. Code Ann. § 58.1-3713.4 (2013). Business license taxes on natural
gas production are collected by Buchanan County, Dickenson County,
Lee County, the city of Norton, Russell County, Scott County, Tazewell
County, and Wise County. Buchanan County, Va., Code § 88-29
(2013); Dickenson County, Va., Coal, Gas, and Oil Severance
Tax Ordinance § 1 (2012); Lee County, Va., Mineral Severance
License Tax Ordinance (2012); Norton, Va., Code § 11-53 (2011);
Tazewell County, Va., Code of Ordinances § 10-112; Wise
County, Va., Amendment to and Restatement of Wise County
Coal, Gas and Oil Severance License Tax Ordinance #1-2012
(effective June 13, 2013). These political subdivisions comprise 3,119.489
square miles of the 4,966.859 square miles of Virginia political
subdivisions that intersect the shale plays. There is also a provision of
the Virginia tax code that permits counties and cities to elect to replace
real property taxes on natural gas with a gross receipts tax on natural
gas at rates up to one percent, but no cities or counties have made this
election. Va. Code Ann. § 58.1-3286 (2013). Business license taxes on
natural gas production are collected alongside rather than in lieu of real
property taxes on natural gas.

36.

W. Va. Code Ann. § 8A-2-1 (LexisNexis 2012).

37.

W. Va. Const. art. X § 1; Amy Higginbotham, et al., West
Virginia Property Tax Briefing Paper 5–6 (2009). Class 1
property is property used exclusively for agriculture, Class 2 property is
owner-occupied residential property and farmland, Class 3 property is
other real property outside a municipality, and Class 4 property is other
real property inside a municipality. W. Va. Const. art. X § 1; West
Virginia State Auditor, Rates of Levy: State, County, School
and Municipal 2013 Tax Year 1 (2013). The 2013–2014 county and
municipal rate limits are:
Class 1

Class 2

Class 3

Class 4

N/A

0.286%

0.572%

0.572%

Municipality N/A

0.250%

N/A

0.500%

County
Id. at 2–3.
38.

See W. Va. Code Ann. § 11-4-9 (LexisNexis 2013).
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revenue, and banning fracking decreases local property tax revenue.
West Virginia also imposes a tax on severing natural gas at a rate of
5% of gross value of which 7.5% is distributed to the county in which
the natural gas is produced.39 Thus, each West Virginia county
receives 0.375% of the value of natural gas produced within its
jurisdiction. For their part, West Virginia municipalities may impose
business and occupation taxes on gross receipts of natural gas
producers within their jurisdiction.40 Thus, any West Virginia county
or municipality banning fracking would forgo substantial revenue.
That only two cities comprising only 0.055% of West Virginia’s shale
plays have ever imposed fracking bans is consistent with local
government revenue maximization in light of these local real property
taxes, severance taxes, and business and occupation taxes.
Two counties, one city, and thirteen towns exercise the Euclidian
zoning power in Maryland’s shale plays.41 Maryland counties must
impose an income tax at a rate between 1% and 3.2%, and so Garrett
County and Allegheny County—covering the vast majority of
Maryland’s shale plays—both collect income taxes.42 On the other
hand, Maryland’s local property taxes do not include natural gas.43
Indeed, the city and towns in Maryland’s shale plays that do not
collect income taxes collect no representative taxes on fracking. It is
therefore unsurprising that one of these fourteen political subdivisions,
the town of Mountain Lake Park, banned fracking.44 This ban covers
13.99% of Maryland’s non-county political subdivisions in the shale
plays but only 0.180% of all the state’s shale play political
subdivisions.
Pennsylvania counties, cities, boroughs, towns, and townships
exercise the zoning power.45 Each of these political subdivisions levy
real property taxes, but per a 2002 decision of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, real property valuations in the state do not include
39.

W. Va. Code Ann. § 11-13A-3a (LexisNexis 2013); W. Va. Code
Ann. § 11-13A-5a (LexisNexis 2013). Another 2.5% of this severance tax
is distributed to all West Virginia counties and municipalities on the
basis of population irrespective of the location of natural gas production.
Id.

40.

W. Va. Code Ann. § 8-13-5 (LexisNexis 2012).

41.

Md. Code Ann., Land Use § 4-101 (Lexis Nexis (2014); Md. Code
Ann., Land Use § 1-101 (Lexis Nexis 2014).

42.

Md. Code Ann., Tax-Gen. § 10–103 (LexisNexis 2014); Md. Code
Ann., Tax-Gen. § 10–106 (LexisNexis 2014).

43.

Calvin Kent et al., Taxation of Natural Gas: A Comparative
Analysis 38 (2011).

44.

Mountain Lake Park, Va., Ordinance No. 2011-01 (effective Mar.
3, 2011).

45.

53 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 10101 (West 2014).
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the value of oil and gas resources—and so these jurisdictions receive
no real property taxes on account of the value of natural gas
deposits.46 Pennsylvania cities, boroughs, towns, and townships are
prohibited from imposing a tax on “natural resources . . . in such
political subdivision[s] or on the preparation or processing thereof for
use or market, or on any privilege, act or transaction related to the
business of manufacturing, the production, preparation, or processing
of . . . natural resources” except for “a local services tax and taxes on
the occupation, per capita and earned income or net profits of natural
persons engaged in the above activities.”47 Local services taxes and per
capita occupation taxes on natural gas workers within a locality may
be collected only by the locality of employment and may not exceed
$52 per natural gas worker per year.48 The earned income and net
profits taxes on natural gas production may be imposed at rates up to
1%, but the definitions of these taxes limit them to income from
natural gas worker wages and profits from the provision of natural gas
personal services and they may only be imposed on residents.49 Thus,
prior to February 14, 2012, Pennsylvania localities could receive from
fracking only 1% of the wages of residents employed in the production
of natural gas and $52 from nonresident natural gas workers and
received no property tax revenue from fracking.
Facing this relative dearth of local fracking revenue, the city of
Pittsburgh, four surrounding boroughs, and the borough of Harveys
Lake banned fracking, covering 0.227% of Pennsylvania’s shale
plays.50 But the revenue scenario changed abruptly with the passage
of Pennsylvania Act 13 on February 14, 2012.51 Act 13 imposed an
“unconventional gas well fee” of tens of thousands of dollars per year
on each unconventional natural gas well. Proceeds from this fee above
46.

72 Pa. Stat. Ann, § 5020–201 (West 2013); Indep. Oil & Gas Ass’n of
Pa. v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals of Fayette Cnty., 814 A.2d 180, 184
(Pa. 2002).

47.

53 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 6924.301.1(f)(4) (West 2013).

48.

53 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 6924.311(7) (West 2013); 53 Pa. Stat. Ann.
§ 6924.311(8) (West 2013). Taxes on workers of amounts more than $10
must be imposed on a “millage or percentage . . . basis.” 53 Pa. Stat.
Ann. § 6924.311(7) (West 2013).

49.

53 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 6924.301.1 (West 2013); 53 Pa. Stat. Ann.
§ 6924.311(12)(2) (West 2013); 53 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 6913 (West 2013);
53 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 6924.501 (West 2013). Pittsburgh may also levy
up to an additional 0.55% payroll tax. 53 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 6924.303(a)
(West 2013).

50.

Forest Hills, Pa., Ordinance 1017 (Oct. 19, 2011); Emsworth, Pa.,
Ordinances § 161 (2011); Baldwin, Pa., Code § 121 (2011); Harveys
Lake, Pa., Ordinance 4 (2011); Wilkinsburg, Pa., Ordinance 2870 (July
20, 2011); West Homestead, Pa., Ordinance 659 (May, 10, 2011).

51.

H.B. 1950, Gen. Assemb., Sess. of 2012 (Pa. 2012).
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a statutorily set amount—approximately $17 million in 2014—
are distributed to the localities in which the wells are located on a per
well basis.52 And while new local legislatures in New York continue to
ban fracking, no new local legislature in Pennsylvania has enacted a
fracking ban since the enactment of Act 13. Since then, Pennsylvania
has resembled Ohio in that only voters, not legislatures representing
voters, have imposed a fracking ban. If the provision of per well
revenue by Act 13 is responsible for the cessation of legislative local
bans in Pennsylvania and not increases in popular support for
fracking, then it is likely that more voter bans are to come.
New York cities, towns, and villages exercise the Euclidian zoning
power.53 Any city with one million or more inhabitants may impose a
local income tax, but only the city of New York has sufficient
inhabitants to levy this tax, and it is outside the shale plays.54 Real
property assessments in New York include the value of natural gas.55
But the impact of this inclusion on the exercise of the local zoning
power is eliminated by New York’s constitution and general laws that
together permit each city, town, and village to adjust tax rates as
necessary to raise a statutorily calculated sum each year. The
constitution implicitly limits city and village property tax rates—not
town property tax rates—by capping yearly revenue not raised for
debt service to two percent of the five-year average of the full
valuation of all taxable real estate within the taxing jurisdiction.56
Because this constitutional provision permits taxes in excess of two
percent so long as the excess is allocated to debt service, the
constitutional cap is practically superfluous because real property tax
rates sufficiently high enough to reach the cap are politically
unsustainable.57
52.

58 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2314(d)(1) (2014). This residue is divided such
that 36% is distributed to counties per well located in the county, 37%
is distributed to municipalities per well located in the municipality, and
27% is distributed to municipalities in counties in which wells are
located based upon a complex formula. 58 Pa. Cons. Stat.
§ 2314(d)(1)–(3) (2014).

53.

New York General City Law § 20.24 (McKinney 2014); New York
General City Law § 20.25 (McKinney 2014); New York Town Law § 261
(McKinney 2014); New York Village Law § 7-700 (McKinney 2014).

54.

New York Tax Law § 1301 (McKinney 2014). The city of Yonkers, also
outside the shale play, has special statutory authority to levy an income
tax. Yonkers, N.Y., Code § 15-100 (2013); Yonkers, N.Y., Code
§ 15-116 (2005).

55.

New York Real Property Tax § 594 (McKinney 2014).

56.

N.Y. Const. art. VIII, § 10.

57.

Cities, towns, and villages generally may borrow up to 7% of the fiveyear average of the full valuation of all taxable real estate within the
borrowing political subdivision. N.Y. Const. art. VIII § 4. New York
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Further, a more stringent statutory cap on the growth of city,
town, and village real property tax revenue including revenue
allocated to debt service was enacted in 2011.58 The cap is not
increased or decreased due to changes in assessed valuations. This
means that the total value of real property as determined through
assessments in New York do not really determine the amount of
revenue that may be collected—the only practical import of these
assessments is the determination of the relative burden of real
property taxation as between different real property owners. Thus,
New York cities, towns, and villages in the shale plays may effectively
raise from real property taxes the full amount permitted under the
statutory cap irrespective of any changes in assessed valuation due to
natural gas. And so the revenue of the local jurisdictions in New York
that exercise the Euclidian zoning power is effectively insulated from
the decision whether to ban or permit fracking.
New York local revenues, however, are not politically insulated
from the decision whether to ban or permit fracking because there are
political limits in addition to legal limits on the amount of taxation
that may be imposed. The political constraints likely result in some
jurisdictions raising less through real property taxes than is permitted
under the statutory cap because to raise the full amount would inhibit
reelection of legislatures setting the amount to be raised. But this
ultimate political check on raising revenue is a far weaker constraint
on the exercise of the zoning power than legal checks on raising
revenue through property taxes such as those in place in Ohio and
Kentucky. A local legislature that maximizes both revenue and tenure
sets the amount of revenue at the highest politically supportable
amount. The addition of valuable real property to be taxed would
increase the amount of revenue raised at the same rate. Thus, all else
being equal, an addition to the tax base should increase the politically
supportable amount that can be raised and a reduction of the tax
base should likewise decrease the politically supportable amount that
can be raised. But these marginal increases and decreases may be
entirely offset by political realities where a ban is politically popular
because the imposition of the ban may secure to the local legislature
additional votes that are a sufficient electoral buffer to result in a net
increase of the politically supportable amount.
Furthermore, any locality in New York with a politically
supportable amount of revenue from real property taxes that
significantly exceeds the statutory cap faces neither a legal nor a
political revenue reason not to ban fracking. Any reductions in the
City may borrow up to 10% of the average valuation and cities of more
than 125,000 inhabitants may borrow up to 9% of the average valuation.
Id.
58.

N.Y. General Municipal Law § 3-c (McKinney 2014).
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property tax base resulting from a local fracking ban may be offset by
rate increases without exceeding the politically sustainable amounts.
And so local legislatures in New York that raise the full amount
authorized under the statutory cap may secure additional political
security by banning fracking without any sacrifice in revenue.
Thus, New York cities, towns, and villages have at best a weak
political check on revenue that constrains the exercise of the Euclidian
zoning power and at worst have neither a political nor a legal check.
Determining whether shale play localities comfortably collect the full
amount authorized under the statutory cap is outside the scope of this
Article. Even if the cap were not ever imposed and all New York
localities were collecting maximum politically supportable amounts,
the political check that would operate is likely to be weak in the face
of significant popular opposition to fracking.

III. Representation Through Taxation
The foregoing suggests the presence or absence of certain forms of
taxation influences the exercise of the zoning power by local
governments. Some forms of taxation evidently represent fracking
interests because governments prefer policies that increase revenue
and disdain policies that decrease revenue. Where fracking leads to
revenue increases for local governments, legislative fracking bans are
exceedingly scarce. Where fracking does not lead to revenue increases
by local governments, fracking bans are far more prevalent. These
data support the hypothesis that private interests may be represented
through taxation as well as elections. Income taxes would represent
interests that produce income. Properly limited ad valorem property
taxes would represent interests that increase the value of real
property. Sales taxes would represent interests that increase
transactions in the marketplace. The mix of taxes collected by a
government would dramatically influence its operation. Two
metaphors are apt for the role representative taxation may play in
this democratic republic. Elected officials have both vote-seeking
leaves and revenue-seeking roots. And so the opinions of electoral
majorities in the United States provide the sail whilst representative
taxation offers an important anchor.
Purely electoral theoretical models of American local, state, and
federal governments focus on the decision-making of individual elected
officials, but the underlying tendency of governments to maximize
revenue is likely an institutional phenomena. An institution tends to
maximize what the institution measures. A proposal made by an
individual that happens to be likely to increase the measured quantity
garners support within the institution even if the proposal is not made
by an individual who aims to increase the measured quantity. This
institutional phenomenon may operate within governments that
measure revenue so long as there are proposals capable of affecting
the amount of revenue that can be collected. And for private interests
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to be represented as a result, the amount of revenue that can be
collected must be dependent on the advancement of private interests.
Once these conditions are satisfied, a government’s actions are likely
to deviate from the sum of the interests of individual legislatures
pursuing political security and advancement by pleasing voters and
campaign contributors. For example, banning fracking appears at the
moment politically popular but in local jurisdictions that tax fracking
this political popularity does not yield the desired local legislation.
At first blush, this all may seem undemocratic because the carrot
of revenue must compete with the carrot of votes in guiding elected
governments in determining policy. But the purpose of elections is to
insure that in determining policy “the decisive voice w[ill] be that of
the people.”59 And the people may speak with two voices, as voters
and as taxpayers. If the private interests represented by taxes
approximate the public interest, it is perfectly legitimate for the voice
of the people as taxpayers to trump occasionally the voice of the
people as voters.
As the discussion of New York local governments other than the
cities of New York and Yonkers illustrates, not all governments in the
United States are likely to be influenced by taxation because some
local governments may easily collect year after year a statutorily
capped amount of revenue.60 Local governments that collect no
representative taxes are a valuable control group for empirical
research on representative taxation. In these jurisdictions, the people
speak only as voters. Further empirical research into the differences
between these local governments and other similarly situated local
governments that collect representative taxes will either empirically
support or refute the theory that many governments in the United
States can be modeled as seeking both votes and revenue. The results
of this initial investigation into fracking bans makes consideration of
implications of governmental revenue seeking and representative
taxation for environmental policy immediately worthwhile.

IV. Implications for Environmental Policy
If taxation both influences policy and represents private interests,
then the composition of government revenues should be considered in
determining the proper locus of environmental policymaking.
The environmental policymaking locus determination has two
distinct dimensions. Horizontally, what policymaking role should be
59.

Robert A. Caro, The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the
Fall of New York 18 (1974).

60.

The cap on local government revenue in New York is only two years
old. As outlined above, prior to the cap, there was a weak form of
representation of private interests through taxation. Local governments
elsewhere may have not collected representative taxes for even longer.
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played by legislatures, executives, judges, and agencies? Vertically,
what policymaking role should be played by the federal government,
states, and localities? Along each of these dimensions there are two
appropriate evaluative criteria. First, will the governmental actor
select the proper balance between environmental protection and other
concerns? Second, will the governmental entity act rigorously but
with restraint in achieving the selected balance? And so the choice of
policymaker involves two analyses for each of the twelve different
potential horizontal and vertical loci, twenty-four different analyses in
all. This Article provides comparative policy and taxation data on
only one of the twelve loci, local legislatures. Rather than broaden the
scope of this Article’s discussion of implications for environmental
policy beyond the scope of the data provided, this section will analyze
only local legislatures, as shown by the bolded text in Table 2. This
limited discussion will hopefully demonstrate that the theory of
representative taxation may offer a great deal to the evaluation of the
twenty-two other environmental policymaking locus analyses as well.

Legislature

Executive

Judge

Agency

Balance Selection

Balance Selection

Balance Selection

Balance Selection

Federal
Rigor and Restraint Rigor and Restraint Rigor and Restraint Rigor and Restraint
Balance Selection

Balance Selection

Balance Selection

Balance Selection

State
Rigor and Restraint Rigor and Restraint Rigor and Restraint Rigor and Restraint
Balance Selection

Balance Selection

Balance Selection

Balance Selection

Local
Rigor and Restraint

Rigor and Restraint Rigor and Restraint Rigor and Restraint

Table 2: Policymaking Locus Inquiry Matrix
A.

Local Legislative Balance Selection

Environmental protection is but one of the many competing
concerns for local legislatures and the people they represent. One way
to frame the resulting choice is the selection of the point at which
greater environmental protection is worth less than its cost. This
abstraction is overly linear and divorced from day-to-day decisionmaking processes. The better view is that for each decision maker
there are sets of decisions in which environmental protection wins out
against other concerns, and there are sets of decisions in which
environmental protection loses out. Thus, there is not a point on a
single line of policy with environmental protection on one side and
everything else on the other; there is a complex process by which
greater environmental protection is selected in some instances and less
environmental protection is selected in other instances. Even in this
diffuse and nonlinear decision making process, the relative size of the
sets may be said to represent the selection of the balance between
concerns over environmental protection and everything else.
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In every locality the theoretical returns from elections on every
decision implicating environmental protection concerns constitutes the
potential direct electoral selection of the locally desired environmental
protection balance. This is the balance that would be selected if a
locality were governed as a pure democracy. There are too many local
governments in the United States to say how many localities exist in
which the zoning power is always and only exercised by local voters,
but such a form of local government is apparently exceedingly rare.61
In a typical locality, day-to-day environmental policy determinations
are made by elected representatives. The election of representatives
by members of the community is believed to achieve more efficiently,
though not perfectly, the selection of a balance that matches the
theoretical balance that would be selected by direct elections. This,
then, is the electoral representation of private preferences in the
determination of environmental policy. Where local government
revenues are invariable, the results of electoral representation alone on
policymaking are most evident.
Local representative taxation through income taxes and limited
ad valorem property taxes evidently shifts the balance selection away
from the balance that would be selected by the process of electoral
representation alone. Where these taxes are collected, the interests of
fracking represented through local taxation are more often able to
withstand the forces of electoral representation in the face of electoral
expressions of local preferences that might otherwise be sufficient to
result in a local legislative ban of the practice.
Representative taxation does not necessarily shift the selection of
the balance between environmental protection and everything else
away from the theoretical direct election balance. Given the power of
small but motivated groups to sway generalized electoral outcomes,
the pure electoral representation outcome might often be farther from
the theoretical direct electoral outcome than would be the outcome of
a combined system of both electoral and taxation representation.
And representative taxation does not necessarily result in less
environmental protection than pure electoral representation. If local
legislatures tax environmental benefits directly or indirectly, then the
phenomena of representative taxation would theoretically increase the
size of the set of decisions that select greater environmental protection
over other interests.62
Local taxation system variance from state to state and locality to
locality ought to be considered in analyzing the local legislative
61.

A few small localities hold town meetings in which the zoning power is
exercised by direct elections.

62.

There are few, if any, taxes imposed directly on environmental benefits
in the United States. Some have even proposed environmental detriment
taxes such as excise taxes on energy consumption or carbon emissions.
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selection of the balance between environmental protection and
everything else.
For example, the presence of local income taxes seems to
dramatically impact the exercise of the zoning power. Thus, the local
income tax jurisdictions in Ohio, cities and villages, stand in stark
relief to those jurisdictions that collect only the limited ad valorem
property tax, townships, when viewing a general zoning map.

Figure 8: Northeast Ohio Income Tax Localities Map
Alongside Northeast Ohio General Zoning Map63

The visible differences in permitted residential density and
permitted uses between the zoning in the Ohio cities and villages on
the one hand and Ohio townships on the other could be explained as
a result of differences in the preferences of voters. A model that
instead points to the differences in local revenue systems offers an
explanation that assumes less variance in individual preferences. If
variance in local taxation system plays a role in the variance in local
legislative outcomes, then prevailing views regarding the degree of
variance in individual environmental preferences ought to
be reexamined.
B.

Local Legislative Rigor and Restraint

Once a local legislature selects a balance between environmental
protection and everything else, putting that environmental policy into
practice effectively and efficiently requires both rigor and restraint.
Rigor ensures that the environmental policy is actually achieved.
Restraint is required to ensure that other interests are not unduly
sacrificed in the achievement of the environmental policy.

63.

Interested in looking at how we currently are using land in Northeast
Ohio?, VibrantNEO.org (Mar. 26, 2013), http://vibrantneo.org
/planning-and-zoning/interested-in-looking-at-how-we-currently-areusing-land-in-northeast-ohio/.
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To some degree, electoral representation imbues rigor and restraint
into the process of local legislative policy implementation. But there
are significant limits. Generally, future elections offer the only means
of retrospective evaluation of the work of local legislators. For the
prospect of future elections to ensure rigor and restraint, not only
must current local legislators be highly motivated by the prospect of
future electoral failure, local legislators must also believe that the
failure to act rigorously yet with restraint to effectively and efficiently
achieve the policies desired by the electorate has a significant
probability of impeding reelection. To the extent this is not so or is
insufficient, electoral representation depends upon the ability of voters
to prospectively evaluate candidates for local office. That is, voters
are tasked not only with selecting candidates who will pursue the
policies desired by the voters, but also candidates whose work will
likely achieve those policies without undue sacrifice of other important
interests. This is a tall order because the best indicator of an
individual’s rigor—passion for desired policies—is too often an
indicator of an absence of an individual’s restraint stemming from a
myopic focus on some policies to the exclusion of other interests.
Whether these limits render electoral representation as a means to
ensure rigor or restraint insufficient is a matter beyond the scope of
this Article, but the problem these limits create is evident. Electoral
representation alone may ensure nothing more than that local
legislators will either espouse the environmental policy desired by the
electoral majority while working none too hard to achieve that policy,
doing only as much is required to gain electoral support, or work hard
to actually achieve the desired environmental policy yet do so by
needlessly and unduly sacrificing other important interests.
Fortunately, representative taxation theoretically may yield rigor
and restraint in local legislative environmental policy implementation.
If local legislatures institutionally tend to maximize revenue and
revenue depends in part on environmental quality, then greater
environmental protection would tend to be achieved even without the
presence of individual local legislators who passionately pursue
environmental protection. And if private interests are represented
through the generation of revenue, local legislation designed to
achieve a desired environmental policy may tend to be shaped so as
not to unnecessarily and unduly harm private interests because
harming these private interests would result in the loss of revenue.

Conclusion
This Article has shown an evident variation in local legislative
responses to fracking. While there are many possible explanations,
this Article has offered the theory that in some localities the private
interests associated with fracking are well-represented by the taxes
they pay while in other localities they are not. The additional
representation of the private interests associated with fracking would
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stem from the institutional tendency of local governments to prefer
policies that augment variable revenues. In some localities, fracking
has the potential to increase local revenues and so would have greater
institutional support while in other localities fracking does not have
the potential to increase local revenues and so would have less
institutional support. In this way, taxation may dramatically affect
the local formulation of environmental policy. For that reason,
representative taxation should be considered in determining the
proper locus of environmental policymaking. This Article begins that
effort by examining its role in one potential decision-making locus.
This is only a start—representative taxation may play an even
greater role in our system of government. The theory of representative
taxation may explain a great deal. Perhaps many Americans do not
exercise the right to vote because their interests are represented
sufficiently through the taxes they pay. Perhaps the United States
runs a large trade deficit because the federal government is prohibited
from taxing exports but may tax imports and accordingly cultivates
imports more than exports. Perhaps Americans who greatly distrust
government live under local and state governments that do not levy
sufficiently representative taxes to yield high-quality governance.
These are but a few of the contemporary puzzles to which
representative taxation may provide the answer.
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Appendix

Maryland
Mountain Lake Park Town

Ban64

New York
Albany

City

Ban65

Alfred

Town

Moratorium66

Alfred

Village

Moratorium67

Altamont

Village

Ban68

Andes

Town

Moratorium69

Annsville

Town

Moratorium70

Augusta

Town

Moratorium71

Ava

Town

Moratorium72

Avon

Town

Moratorium73

Barrington

Town

Moratorium74

64.

Mountain Lake Park, Md., Ordinance 2011-01 (Mar. 3, 2011).

65.

Albany, N.Y., Code § 375-112-a (2012).

66.

Alfred Town, N.Y., Moratorium on and Prohibition of Gas and
Petroleum Exploration and Extraction Activities, Underground Storage
of Natural Gas, and Disposal of Natural Gas or Petroleum Extraction,
Exploration, and Production Wastes (2011).

67.

Alfred Village, N.Y., Ordinance 2014-03 (2014).

68.

Altamont, N.Y., Code § 355-12(B) (2012).

69.

Andes, N.Y., Ordinance 2011-03 (Jan. 9, 2012).

70.

Annsville, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (Feb. 9, 2012).

71.

Augusta, N.Y., Ordinance 2011-01 (July 1, 2011).

72.

Ava, N.Y., Ordinance 2011-02 (Dec. 19, 2011).

73.

Avon, N.Y., Moratorium on and Prohibition of Gas and Petroleum
Exploration and Extraction Activities Underground Storage of Natural
Gas and Disposal of Natural Gas or Petroleum Extraction Exploration
and Production Waste Town Moratorium (Mar. 22, 2012).

74.

Barrington, N.Y., A Local Law Imposing a One-Year Moratorium on
Drilling for Natural Gas Within the Marcellus or Other Shales (July 13,
2011).
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Beacon

City

Ban75

Benton

Town

Moratorium76

Bethel

Town

Ban77

Binghamton

City

Ban78

Blenheim

Town

Moratorium79

Brighton

Town

Moratorium80

Bristol

Town

Moratorium81

Brookfield

Town

Moratorium82

Buffalo

City

Ban83

Caledonia

Town

Moratorium84

Camillus

Town

Ban85

Canandaigua

City

Moratorium86

Caroline

Town

Moratorium87

Cherry Valley

Town

Ban88

Chester

Town

Moratorium89

75.

Beacon, N.Y., Code § 223-17.2 (2012).

76.

Benton, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-02 (Sept. 22, 2012).

77.

Bethel, N.Y., Code § 345 (2012).

78.

Binghamtom, N.Y., Code § 250 (2011).

79.

Blenheim, N.Y., Prohibition Within the Town of Blenheim of Natural
Gas and Petroleum Exploration and Extraction Activities, Underground
Storage of Natural Gas, and Disposal of Natural Gas or Petroleum
Extraction, Exploration, and Production Wastes (2014).

80.

Brighton, N.Y., Hydraulic Fracturing
Moratorium Local Law (June 8, 2011).

81.

Bristol, N.Y., Ordinance 2013-02 (2013).

and

Related

82.

Brookfield, N.Y., Resolution No. 80 (Oct. 6, 2012).

83.

Buffalo, N.Y., Code § 228 (2011).

84.

Caledonia, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (June 14, 2012).

85.

Camillus, N.Y., Code § 405(A) (2011).

86.

Canandaigua, N.Y., Ordinance 2013-06 (Aug. 4, 2013).

87.

Caroline, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (Mar. 13, 2012).

88.

Cherry Valley, N.Y., Ordinance 2011-03 (2011).
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Colden

Town

Moratorium90

Conesus

Town

Moratorium91

Copake

Town

Moratorium92

Cortlandville

Town

Moratorium93

Danby

Town

Ban94

Danube

Town

Moratorium95

DeWitt

Town

Ban96

Dryden

Town

Ban97

Eaton

Town

Moratorium98

Elbridge

Town

Moratorium99

Enfield

Town

Ban100

Fabius

Town

Moratorium101

Forestburgh

Town

Ban102

Freeville

Village

Moratorium103

Fulton

Town

Moratorium104

89.

Chester, N.Y., Ordinance 2013-01 (2013).

90.

Colden, N.Y., Ordinance 2013-01 (2013).

91.

Conesus, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (2012).

92.

Copake, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-02 (Oct. 12, 2012).

93.

Cortlandville, N.Y., Ordinance 2010-04 (Aug. 4, 2010).

94.

Danby, N.Y., Ordinance 2011-03 (2011).

95.

Danube, N.Y., Ordinance 2013-01 (Jan 6, 2013).

96.

DeWitt, N.Y., Code § 114 (2013).

97.

Dryden, N.Y., Zoning Ordinance § 2104 (2011).

98.

Eaton, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-02 (Aug. 4, 2012).

99.

Elbridge, N.Y., Resolution 121-10 (Dec. 1, 2010).

100. Enfield, N.Y., Ordinance 2013-01 (2013).
101. Fabis, N.Y., Ordinance 2013-01 (2013).
102. Forestburgh, Ordinance 2012-02 (Aug. 28, 2012).
103. Freeville, N.Y., Ordinance 2011-06 (2011).
104. Fulton, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (Sept. 20, 2012).
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Geneseo

Town

Moratorium105

Geneva

Town

Ban106

Genoa

Town

Moratorium107

Germantown

Town

Moratorium108

Gorham

Town

Moratorium109

Guilderland

Town

Ban110

Highland

Town

Ban111

Hopewell

Town

Moratorium112

Hudson

City

Ban113

Huron

Town

Moratorium114

Ithaca

Town

Ban115

Ithaca

City

Public Ban116

Jerusalem

Town

Ban117

Kirkland

Town

Moratorium118

105. Genesco, N.Y., Interim Moratorium on All Natural Gas and Oil
Activities (2012).
106. Geneva, N.Y. Code § 165 (2011).
107. Genoa, N.Y., Ordinance 2013-01 (2013).
108. Germantown, N.Y., Moratorium on Natural Gas and/or Petroleum
Exploration Activities, Natural Gas and/or Petroleum Extraction
Activities, and/or Natural Gas and/or Petroleum Support Activities
(2012).
109. Gorham, N.Y., Ordinance 2010-02 (Dec. 30, 2010).
110. Guilderland, N.Y., Zoning Law § 280-23 (2012).
111. Highland, N.Y., Code § 190-27 (2012).
112. Hopewell, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-02 (June 27, 2012).
113. Hudson, N.Y., Code § 325 (2013).
114. Huron, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-06 (2012).
115. Ithaca Town, N.Y., Code § 270 (2011).
116. Ithaca City, N.Y., Resolution Prohibiting the Leasing of City of IthacaOwned Land for Hydraulic-fracturing Natural Gas Drilling and
Extraction (Oct. 13, 2011).
117. Jerusalem, N.Y., Zoning Law § 160 (2012).
118. Kirkland, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-06 (2012).
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LaFayette

Town

Moratorium119

Lansing

Town

Moratorium120

Ledyard

Town

Moratorium121

Lenox

Town

Moratorium122

Lima

Town

Moratorium123

Lincoln

Town

Moratorium124

Little Falls

City

Moratorium125

Livonia

Town

Moratorium126

Locke

Town

Moratorium127

Lumberland

Town

Ban128

Manchester

Town

Moratorium129

Manheim

Town

Moratorium130

Marbletown

Town

Ban131

Marcellus

Town

Moratorium132

Marshall

Town

Moratorium133

Middleburgh

Town

Moratorium134

119. LaFayette, N.Y., Town Board Resolution (Aug. 26, 2013).
120. Lansing, N.Y., Ordinance 2013-02 (2013).
121. Ledyard, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (Mar. 12, 2012).
122. Lenox, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (2012).
123. Lima, N.Y., Ordinance 2013-02 (July 11, 2013).
124. Lincoln, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (2012).
125. Little Falls, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (Mar. 20, 2012).
126. Livonia, N.Y., Ordinance 2011-01 (Dec. 15, 2011).
127. Locke, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (2012).
128. Lumberland, N.Y., Zoning Law § 10 (2012).
129. Manchester, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-02 (Mar. 20, 2012).
130. Manheim, N.Y., Resolution No. 23 (Nov. 22, 2011).
131. Marbletown, N.Y., Code § 129 (2013).
132. Marcellus, N.Y., Ordinance 2010-02 (2010).
133. Marshall, N.Y., Ordinance 2011-01 (July 17, 2011).
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Middlefield

Town

Ban135

Middlesex

Town

Moratorium136

Milo

Town

Moratorium137

Minden

Town

Moratorium138

Moravia

Town

Moratorium139

Naples

Town

Moratorium140

Naples

Village

Moratorium141

New Lisbon

Town

Ban142

New Paltz

Town

Ban143

New Paltz

Village

Ban144

Newfield

Town

Moratorium145

Newport

Town

Moratorium146

Niagara Falls

City

Ban147

Niles

Town

Ban148

Niskayuna

Town

Moratorium149

134. Middleburgh, N.Y., Ordinance 2013-01 (2013).
135. Middlefield, N.Y., Ordinance 2011-01 (June 14, 2011).
136. Middlesex, N.Y., Ordinance 2011-03 (Dec. 27, 2011).
137. Milo, N.Y., Resolution No. 22-11 (May 16, 2011).
138. Minden, N.Y., Moratorium on Horizontal and Directional Gas Drilling
and Hydraulic Fracturing (2012).
139. Moravia, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (Feb. 15, 2012).
140. Naples Town, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-A (Nov. 8, 2012).
141. Naples Village, N.Y., Moratorium on Horizontal and Directional Gas
Drilling and Hydraulic Fracturing (Oct. 11, 2011).
142. New Lisbon, N.Y., Protection of Rural Environment Local Law (2011).
143. New Paltz Town, N.Y., Code § 54 (2012).
144. New Paltz Village, N.Y., Code § 212 (2013).
145. Newfield Town, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (June 14, 2012).
146. Newport, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-02 (July 17, 2011).
147. Niagara Falls, N.Y., Code § 929 (2012).
148. Niles, N.Y., Code § 138 (2013).
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Olive

Town

Moratorium150

Oneida

County

Public Ban151

Oneonta

City

Ban152

Oneonta

Town

Moratorium153

Onondaga

County

Public Ban154

Ontario

County

Public Ban155

Oppenheim

Town

Moratorium156

Otego

Town

Moratorium157

Otisco

Town

Moratorium158

Otsego

Town

Ban159

Owasco

Town

Moratorium160

Owego

Village

Moratorium161

Oxford

Village

Ban162

Palatine

Town

Moratorium163

Penfield

Town

Moratorium164

149. Niskayuna, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-10 (2012).
150. Olive, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (2012).
151. Oneida, N.Y., Resolution No. 98 (Apr. 10, 2013).
152. Oneonta, N.Y., Code § 149 (2011).
153. Oneonta Town, N.Y., Code § 103 (2014).
154. Onondaga County, N.Y., Resolution No. 11 (Feb. 2, 2010).
155. Ontario County, N.Y., Resolution No. 762-2010 (Dec. 17, 2010).
156. Oppenheim, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-03 (Aug. 3, 2012).
157. Otego, N.Y., Ordinance 2013-01 (Feb. 2013).
158. Otisco, N.Y., Ordinance 2010-01 (2010).
159. Otsego, N.Y., Code § 1.04 (2011).
160. Owasco, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-02 (Mar. 15, 2012).
161. Owego, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-03 (July 30, 2012).
162. Oxford, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (Feb. 5, 2012).
163. Palatine, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (Apr. 18, 2012).
164. Penfield, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (Nov. 7, 2012).
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Perinton

Town

Ban165

Plainfield

Town

Ban166

Portage

Town

Moratorium167

Red Hook

Town

Ban168

Remsen

Town

Ban169

Rensselaerville

Town

Moratorium170

Richmond

Town

Moratorium171

Rochester

City

Moratorium172

Rochester

Town

Ban173

Rome

City

Ban174

Roseboom

Town

Ban175

Rosendale

Town

Ban176

Rush

Town

Moratorium177

Sangerfield

Town

Moratorium178

Sennett

Town

Moratorium179

165. Perinton, N.Y., Code § 205 (2012).
166. Plainfield, N.Y., Ordinance 2011-01 (2011).
167. Portage, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (Sept. 19, 2012).
168. Red Hook, N.Y., Code § 143-11 (2013).
169. Remsen, N.Y., Ordinance 2011-02 (2011).
170. Rensselaerville, N.Y., Ordinance 2011-03 (2011) (Nov. 10, 2011).
171. Richmond, N.Y., Ordinance 2014-01 (Jan. 14, 2014). “There was
applause from the residents and guests.” Richmond Town Board
Organizational Meeting 29 (Jan 10, 2012, 7:00 PM) available at
http://townofrichmond.org/content/Generic/View/55:field=documents;
/content/Documents/File/247.pdf.
172. Rochester, N.Y., Ordinance 2013-204 (June 19, 2013).
173. Rochester, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-02 (July 16, 2012).
174. Rome, N.Y., Code § 80 (2011).
175. Roseboom, N.Y., Protection of Rural Environment Local Law (2012).
176. Rosendale, N.Y., Code § 75 (2012).
177. Rush, N.Y., Zoning Law § 120 (2013).
178. Sangerfield, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (2012).
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Seward

Town

Moratorium180

Skaneateles

Town

Ban181

Spafford

Town

Ban182

South Bristol

Town

Moratorium183

St. Johnsville

Town

Moratorium184

St. Johnsville

Village

Moratorium185

Stafford

Town

Moratorium186

Starkey

Town

Moratorium187

Sullivan

County

Public Ban188

Summerhill

Town

Ban189

Syracuse

City

Ban190

Taghkanic

Town

Moratorium191

Torrey

Town

Moratorium192

Trenton

Town

Moratorium193

Trumansburg

Village

Ban194

179. Sennett, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (Feb 14, 2012).
180. Seward, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-02 (Sept. 18, 2012).
181. Skaneateles, N.Y., Zoning Law § 148 (2012).
182. Spafford, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-02 (2012).
183. South Bristol, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (Jan. 9, 2012).
184. St. Johnsville Town, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (Feb. 27, 2012).
185. St. Johnsville Village, N.Y., 2012-02 (Aug. 14, 2012).
186. Stafford, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-02 (Oct. 10, 2012).
187. Starkey, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-06 (Feb. 14, 2012).
188. Sullivan, N.Y., Resolution No. 148-10 (Mar. 18, 2010).
189. Summerhill, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (2012).
190. Syracuse, N.Y., Code § 27 (2011).
191. Taghkanic, N.Y., Ordinance 2013-03 (Nov. 10, 2013).
192. Torrey, N.Y., Moratorium on Directional Drilling and Hydraulic
Fracturing (Dec. 28, 2011).
193. Trenton, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (2012).
194. Trumansburg, N.Y., Zoning Ordinance § 901 (2012).
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Tully

Town

Moratorium195

Tusten

Town

Ban196

Ulster

County

Public Ban197

Ulysses

Town

Ban198

Utica

City

Ban199

Vienna

Town

Moratorium200

Vernon

Town

Moratorium201

Verona

Town

Moratorium202

Wales

Town

Moratorium203

Warwick

Town

Ban204

Waterloo

Town

Moratorium205

Wawarsing

Town

Ban206

West Bloomfield

Town

Moratorium207

West Sparta

Town

Moratorium208

Westerlo

Town

Moratorium209

Westmoreland

Town

Moratorium210

195. Tully, N.Y., Ordinance 2013-01 (June 13, 2013).
196. Tusten, N.Y., Code § 14 (2011).
197. Ulster, N.Y., Resolution No. 74 (Mar. 22, 2011).
198. Ulysses, N.Y., Zoning Law § 21 (2011).
199. Utica, N.Y., Code § 2-29-609 (2013).
200. Vienna, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-04 (July 11, 2012).
201. Vernon, N.Y., Ordinance 2011-01 (Sept. 20, 2011).
202. Verona, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (Mar. 7, 2012).
203. Wales, N.Y., Code § 162 (2011).
204. Warwick, N.Y., Code § 164 (2013).
205. Waterloo, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-01 (Sept. 5, 2012).
206. Wawarsing, N.Y., Code § 112 (2012).
207. West Bloomfield, N.Y., Moratorium Law of 2011 (2011).
208. West Sparta, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-02 (Apr. 2012).
209. Westerlo, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-02 (2012).
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Whitesboro

Village

Moratorium211

Wilson

Village

Ban212

Woodstock

Town

Ban213

Yorkshire

Town

Moratorium214

Broadview Heights

City

Voter Ban215

Lake Erie

State

Public Ban216

Hartville

Village

Public Ban217

Hinckley

Township

Public Ban218

Mansfield

City

Voter Ban219

Medina

Township

Public Ban220

Montville

Township

Public Ban221

Sharon

Township

Public Moratorium222

Weathersfield

Township

Ban223

Ohio

210. Westmoreland, N.Y., Ordinance 2013-03 (2013).
211. Whitesboro, N.Y., Ordinance 2011-01 (2011).
212. Wilson, N.Y., Village Board Meeting (July 19, 2012, 7:00 PM) available
at
http://documents.foodandwaterwatch.org/doc/Frack_Actions_
WilsonVillageNY.pdf.
213. Woodstock, N.Y., Code § 260 (2012).
214. Yorkshire, N.Y., Ordinance 2012-02 (Oct. 25, 2012).
215. Broadview Heights, Ohio, Ordinance 115-12 (Sept. 4, 2012).
216. Lake Erie, Ohio, Ordinance 2012-10K (July 11, 2012).
217. Hartville, Ohio, Ordinance 1-11.16 (May 17, 2011).
218. Hinckley Township, Ohio, Ordinance 112111-01 (Nov. 21, 2011).
219. Mansfield, Ohio, Code § 1.03(H)(1) (2012).
220. Medina Township, Ohio, Ordinance to Prohibit Hydrologic Fracking
(Oct. 13, 2011).
221. Montville Township, Ohio, Ordinance 021412.01 (Feb. 14, 2012).
222. Sharon Township, Ohio, Ordinance 11-08-11-3 (Apr. 24, 2012).
223. Weathersfield Township, Ohio, Ordinance 12-091 (Aug. 14, 2012).
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Yellow Springs

Village

Ban224

York

Township

Public Ban225

Plain

Township

Public Ban226

Baldwin

Borough

Ban227

Emsworth

Borough

Ban228

Ferguson

Township

Voter Ban229

Forest Hills

Borough

Ban230

Harveys Lake

Borough

Ban231

Pittsburgh

City

Ban232

West Homestead

Borough

Ban233

Wilkinsburg

Borough

Ban234

Morgantown

City

Ban (overturned)235

Wellsburg

City

Ban (repealed)236

Pennsylvania

West Virginia

224. Yellow Springs, Ohio, Ordinance 2011-25 (May 16, 2011).
225. York Township, Ohio, Ordinance 11-10-08 (Oct. 27, 2011).
226. Plain Township, Ohio, Ordinance 11-371 (July 12, 2011).
227. Baldwin, Pa., Code ch. 121 (effective June, 2011).
228. Emsworth, Pa., Code ch. 161 (effective Aug. 10, 2011).
229. Ferguson, Pa., 2012 General Election Petition (Aug. 6, 2012).
230. Forest Hills, Pa., Ordinance 1017 (Oct. 19, 2011).
231. Harveys Lake, Pa., Ordinance 4 (2011).
232. Pittsburgh, Pa., Code ch. 618 (effective Dec. 1, 2010).
233. West Homestead, Pa., Code ch. 13, pt. 6 (effective May 10, 2011).
234. Wilkinsburg, Pa., Ordinance 2870 (July 20, 2011).
235. Morgantown, W. Va., Code pt. 7, ch. 1, art. 721 (July 3, 2012).
236. Wellsburg City, W. Va., Ordinance 10-13 (2011).
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